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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
St. George Thrift and Loan 
PIainti f f 
v. 
Raymond L. Lowe, 
Defendant 
Raymond L. Lowe, 
Third-Party Plaintiff, 
and Appellee. 
v. 
Gregory A. Knox, 
Third-Party Defendant, 
and Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
Appeal from the Order Granting Summary Judgment for the Plaint-
entered in the Fifth Judicial District Court, Washington County 
The Honorable James L. Shumate 
ISSUES PRESENTED BY APPELLEE'S BRIEF 
1. Has Knox alleged a meritorious claim of innocent misrep-
resentation? 
2. Did Knox raise any genuine issue of material fact in re-
sisting Lowe's motion for summary judgment? 
1 
Case No. 920852CA 
Priority 15 
3 . I s K n o x ' s c l a i m f o r i n n o c e n t m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n barred b 
o p e r a t i o n o f U . C . A . S e c t i o n 7 8 - 1 2 - 2 6 ( 3 ) ? 
DEIERMINAIIVE^AUIHORIIY 
Utah Code Ann-, Section 78~12-~26 (1953) as amended, is the 
central statute relied upon by the Defendant in this case- In 
addition, Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56 is relied upon with 
regard to the Court's granting the Motion of Summary Judgment. 
However, because this Statute and Rule are too lengthy to set ou 
in full, they are included in the addendum, pursuant to Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure 24(f) and 24(a)(6). 
SyMMARY^QF^IHE^ARGyMENTS 
1. Lowe's holding out his property for sale at the asking 
price of ^69,900 was a sufficient act of representation to meet 
that qualification for Knox's case of misrepresentation. 
2. Knox had a legal basis for relying on Lowe's opinion of 
value in circumstances where Lowe denied access to an appraisal. 
3- Knox raised sufficient genuine issues of material fact 
regarding the actual value of Lowe's property at the time of pur 
chase on the face of his deposition to resist Lowe's motion for 
summary judgment. 
4. Knox's claim oi misrepresentation is not barred by the 
statute of limitations due to his reliance on a faulty appraisal 
done by his qualified agent. 
*? 
ARGUMENTS 
I. LOWE'S ASKING AND BARGAINING PRICE WAS AN ASSERTION AND A 
REPRESENTATION. 
"A misrepresentation is an assertion not in accord with the 
facts." Comments a. N§ture^j3f^asserti^on^ A misrepresentation, 
being a false assertion of fact, commonly takes the form of spok-
en or written words. Whether a statement is false depends on the 
meaning of the words in all the circumstances, including what may 
fairly be inferred from them. An assertion may also be inferred 
from conduct other than words." (See Restatement 2d, Contracts, 
159 (1979 ed.). Also, see Crocker z£*Q9LQ~N§t^ 224 
C«A.2d. 496, (Cal. 1964), an innocent misrepresentation case, 
(wherein a seller of closely-held stock had innocently overval-
ued it), which states: 
It is alleged that such a mistake was made here. 
The value of the corporate stock, as reflected 
by the assets of the corporation, its business, 
its prospects, and its goodwill was^certai^nl^y 
§_2§£§=:Ci§I..-£§£.tjL (emphasis added). 
Knox alleges that Lowe advertized his asking price in writ-
ten form, spoke it verbally, and then defended it by other words 
and conduct, such as disclosing information about impending road 
construction and adjacent E<LM land, and, that these various act-
ions were assertions that his property was worth $69,900. (See 
Record^ pp. 77, 200, 204, 206-209, 216-217). Also, while subject 
to varying opinions, the actual value of Lowe's property was ult-
imately as much of a material fact as the value of the corporate 
stock in the above mentioned Crocker case. 
•"!» 
o 
Thus, in the context of the rules de-fined by these author-
rities, the representation element of his case for innocent mis-
representation has been properly alleged. Also, while no Utah 
case for innocent misrepresentation can be located, it has been 
authoritatively stated that an agreement obtained bv misrep-
resentation, fraud, or mi stale is generally voidable. (See Tan-
Q§L_:£jL_Q!strict_Ju^ 649 P.2d 5., (Ut-
ah 1932). (See, generally, Record, at pp. 152-153). 
II. HNOX WAS LEGALLY JUSTIFIED IN RELYING ON LOWE'S REPRESENTA-
TION OF HIS PROPERTY'S VALUE AS FACT AND NOT OPINION 
h)t Restatement 2d, Contracts.* Misrepresentation, 168(2) 
(1979 e . ) , under the tstLe "Reliance on Assertions of Opinion," 
it states? 
If it is reasonable to do so, the recipient of an 
assertion of a person's opinion as to facts not 
disclosed and ngt_gtherwi^e_kngwn to the recipient 
may properly interpret it as an assertion 
(a) that the facts known to that person are A/oT" 
incompatible with his opinion,or 
<b> that he knows facts sufficient to just-
ify him in forming it. 
(emphasis added). "In such a case," according to the explanation 
of this provision of the "Restatement," "the statement of opinion 
becomes, in effect, an assertion as to those facts and may be re-
lied on as such." 
Thus, in l-nox's situation, Lowe was giving an opinion of the 
value of the property at .£69,900. Because the actual value was 
not disclosed and not otherwise !• nown to h no; , (because of his 
inability to obtain an appraisal), h no;< was entitled to assume 
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that Lowe knew facts from which he drew his opinion. And, since 
Knox did not have access to those facts, he was legally entitled 
to rely on Lowe's version of them. 
Well settled law, including that cited by Lowe, is not 
in conflict with the rule stated above. The key phrase from 
•'Restatement" at 168 is as to facts "not otherwise known." In 
this case, the actual value of the property, should a jury find 
it to be $52,000 as Knox alleges, was a fact "not otherwise 
known" to Knox. If Knox had not sought and/or Lowe not de-
nied access to an appraisal, the knowledge of the actual value 
of the property would have been imputed to Knox by case law. 
In 1903, the U.S. Supreme Court stated in Shag.i.rg^v^ Bg^d-
bergA 192 U.S. 419, at 422: 
Where means of knowledge are at hand, and are 
^9y§LL^_§y§li§&l§ to both parties, and the sub-
ject of purchase is ogen^fgr_inseect,ign if the 
purchaser does not avail himself of these means 
he will not be heard to say, to impeach the con-
tract, that he was deceived by the vendor's mis-
representations, (empahsis added)-
In Wright^Vi^Westside^NurBeryj. 787 P.2d 508 (Utah App„ 1990), 
a tort case, there was no appraisal sought and no access denied 
by the property seller. (Parenthetically, that case involved, 
to Knox's best information, Mr- Pendleton, Lowe's attorney, and 
a reversal of the Honorable Judge Shumate's decision at trial 
to send the case to a jury). Thus, in the "Wright" case, as well 
as other Utah cases, the purchaser was charged with the knowledge 
of facts he could have obtained but for his own negligence. 
However, where access to those facts is blocked by the 
seller, a jury may find that reliance on what normally would only 
be the seller's opinion may be justified. (See Baird_Vjj._Efl.gw 
lQ___£B_i 2 9 8 P- 1 1 2i <Utah 1930), at p. 114). Not only would 
the legal foundation from the "Restatement", and "Misrepresenta-
tion" 168 allow Knox to rely on Lowe's "opinion" as to the value 
of the property as a fact, but a jury could find, in light of the 
language from Shagirg above, (and not contravened by any Utah 
authority), that Lowe's property was not "open for inspection," 
that "means of knowledge" were not "at hand," or "equally avail-
able" to Knox. (See, generally, Record, at pp. 153-157). 
Knox does not rely on Restatement, 2nd, Torts, 542, regard-
ing specialized knowledge of an adverse party, as alleged in 
Lowe's brief, for his legal theory of reliance on Lowe's asser-
tions. Further, Knox concedes he maintains no direct action a-
gainst Lowe for specific misrepresentations as to road construc-
tion or unobstructed views from the property. However, he does 
maintain his claim for misrepresentation based upon the disparity 
between Lowe's represented value of £69,900 and the alleged act-
ual value of $52,500. (See Record, pp. 198, 207-213, 218-220, 
234-235) . 
III. KNOX RAISED SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO RESIST LOWE'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE FACE OF HIS DEPOSITION 
In the record are three different opinions regarding the 
value of the property. There is Lowe's assertion inherent in 
the $69,900 sales price, stated in pleadings and Knox's deposi-
tion. (See Record, p. 77, 200, 206-209) There is the Miller 
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appraisal -for $69,500, described in Knox's deposition, (see Re-
cord, pp. 253, 214-217, 220-222) and the value of $52,500, from 
an appraisal obtained by St. George Thrift and Loan, also from 
Knox's deposition as well as the pleadings. (See Record, pp. 78, 
223-226). Lowe denies Knox's alleged value in his pleadings. 
(See Record, pp. 76, 93-94). 
Knox initially alleged that the actual value of the Lowe 
property was only $52,500 in his verified pleadings. (See Re-
cord, pp. 76, 78). Lowe's motion for summary judgment was not 
supported by any affidavits, but soley by pleadings and Knox's 
deposition. "Exhibit #1" attatched to the deposition is the 
Miller appraisal, stating a value of $69,500 for the property. 
Rule 56(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, requires a de-
fense by other than pleadings when a motion for summary judgment 
is supported by affidavits. Further, "The court may permit af-
fidavits to^be^suBQ^emented^or^OBBQl^d: by depositions, . . .(em-
phasis added)- Rule 56(c) states that "The judgment sought shall 
be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, - « . tg~ 
3§i£h§C_yi£h_£!2^ show that there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law." (emphasis added). 
In his summary judgment motion, Lowe brought forth no affi-
davits- Thus, on the face of Rule 56(e), it would seem that Knox 
could rest entirely on his pleadings, since depositions ar& sup-
plementary to affidavits. However, Utah case law has allowed a 
•moving party to rely upon a deposition even when there were no 
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af f i davits. (See UQi.ted_Amer i.can_Li ±e _Ins^_Coi_vJL_Wi.l.l.ey , 444 
P.2d 755 (Utah 1968)). Thus, Knox's deposition, which was pub-
1 i s h e d a n d e r J t e r e d in t o the re c o r d in its e n t i r e t y b y L o w e ' s m o -
tion, was the "affidavit" before the court. (See Record, pp. 
130-131)-
Under the nil e stated i n EL^DkilQ.....EiQ§O.Qi§I....Vi^Ngw^Emgiire^ 
2gv§l2Ei-Co-.jL ^59 P. 2d 1040 (Utah 1983)s 
. . .the trial court may properly conclude that 
there are no genuine issues of fact uniess_the 
£ §£§--.Q£ --tbl®--.!D2vant<ls_af f idav^t_af £LC(MtLY§:LY 
(At 1044, emphasis added) Footnote "1" statess 
We assume, without deciding, that summary 
judgment may not be entered where the moving 
affidavits show OQ_thei.r_£ace that there is 
a material issue of fact. (emphasis added)„ 
And, under Rule 56(c), (wherein summary judgment is only proper 
where depositions and other materials show that there is no gen-
uine issue as to any material fact), Knox resists summary judg-
ment successfully if his deposition discloses the existence of 
such a factual issue. 
Rule 56(e) states that " . . . affidavits shall be made on 
personal knowledge, shall set forth such £acts_as_wou3^d_be_admi>s-
i:LkL^_LQ-§Yid[§Q£^? anc* shall show affirmatively that the affiant 
is competent to testify to the matters stated therein." Based 
upon these requirements, there are no "facts" in the record re-
garding the actual value of property. Neither Lowe's, Miller's, 
or the St. George Thrift & Loan's appraiser's testimonies are in 
the record. All there is is Knox's hearsay testimony about these 
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opinions in his deposition- Thus, Lowe put -forth no facts into 
the record which Knox needed to oppose, (other than by Knox's 
pieadi ngs)-
However, i-f Knox's deposition testimony i,s a -fact about the 
disparities in values between these various opinions, then the 
fact o-f Lowe's and Miller's assertions of values at about 
$70,000, and the fact of the Thrift's appraisal at $52,500 are on 
equal footing, since they are all opinions given by others to 
Knox. The Miller appraisal is no more evidentiary than the 
Thrift's appraisals quoted to Knox ov&r the phone, since all 
enter the record through Knox's deposition and pleadings and in 
no other way. Thus, Knox meets the test laid out in IhQCngck^v^ 
QQQIIJL 604 P-2d 934 (Utah 1979), because he can rely on the spec-
ific fact of the Thrift's appraisal set forth in his deposition, 
and need not rely soley on his pleadings. (See Record, pp- 223-
226)n Further, nothing in his deposition contradicts his plead-
ings, as was the case in IhgrQQck-
Since the only "facts" in Lowe's summary judgment motion 
which Knox was required to resist with "evidence" under Rule 56 
(c) and (e) were contained in one deposition, which on its face 
shows Knox's claim of a $52,500 appraisal communicated to him by 
the Thrift, the district court could not have properly found a-
gainst Knox on a procedural level. 
IV. MILLER'S MISTAKE IN HIS 1986 OPINION SHOULD NOT BE IM-
PUTED TO KNOX IF KNOX'S RELIANCE THEREON WAS REASONABLE 
AND DID NOT PUT HIM ON INQUIRY. 
Lowe's argument appears to be that when Knox received the 
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Miller appraisal in 1986 he was in such a comparable position to 
the proponents in both the McCgnki^e and Kgul.i.s cases that dis-
covery of the misrepresentation in 1986 should be imputed to him 
as a matter of law. (See McCgnkig^v^Hartman, 529 P. 2d 801, (Ut-
ah 1974), and Kgylis^v^Standard^ 746 P. 2d 1182 
(Utah App. 1987)-
*
n
 McQgnjki.e, (not a summary judgment case), the dispute was 
over reservation of mineral rights in a real estate sales con-
tract. The party claiming the misrepresentation had constructive 
possession of recorded deeds which contained the alleged incrimi-
nating facts at the time the sale closed. Subsequently, the 
facts appeared in a title report issued when the property was 
refinanced. Neither document was examined until after the stat-
ute of limitations had run. The court imputed knowledge of the 
facts in the deeds and the title report to the buyer at the time 
these documents were issued. 
*
n
 H'2klIi§? a summary judgment decision, the complainant in-
herited property upon which a service station was built and 
leased to Standard Oil. She discovered after the statute had run 
that the station was built partly on a neighbor's property in 
violation of the lease agreement. The court imputed an earlier, 
"pre-statute" discovery of the breach to her for the following 
reasons: She had lived on the property for seventeen years, was 
aware of neighboring property boundaries, and saw the completed 
service station. The lease agreement had been signed in 1958, 
with an extension signed in 1967. 
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In 196S, she became executrix of the estate to which the 
lease belonged, and became aware of the existence of the lease 
agreement. However, she never bothered, as either executrix of 
the estate or successor in interest, to order copies of the lease 
or extension- When Standard Oil finally furnished copies in 
1982, she recognised a breach, had the property surveyed, discov-
ered the station had been built partly on neighboring property, 
and brought suit-
In these cases, the Court properly imputed constructive pos-
session of key facts to the complainants- In McCgnki.e, the owner 
of property failed to inspect either a deed or a subsequent title 
report- In Kgul^s, an executrix/hier failed to either obtain or 
inspect copies of the contracts giving rights to a major asset 
probated and then owned- Knox, on the other hand, obtained an 
appraisal immediately upon receiving possession of his property, 
and nothing in the appraisal put him on notice that the property 
was actually worth only $52,500 when he had paid $69,900-
The actual value of Lowe's property at the time of Knox's 
purchase was a fact- (See Argument I.) Assuming that the val-
ue was $52,000, and that Lowe actively concealed it before the 
transaction was concluded, the issue becomes the time which Knox 
either discovered the $52,000 value or was put on notice or under 
a legal duty to discover it. While Lowe, as a seller blocking 
alternative opinions, and Miller, Knox's appraiser, were under 
certain legal duties to be accurate in their opinions of the 
property's value, Knox's only legal duty was to reasonably rely 
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on their opinions. 
Had Lowe consented to an identical appraisal by Miller be-
fore the transaction was closed, Knox would have had no basis for 
relying on Lowe's opinion, and would be liable for Miller's mis-
takes. However, once entitled to rely on Lowe's opinion, (see 
Argument II.), which was a misrepresentation, Knox's legal duties 
as to when the misrepresentation was discovered flow only from 
what a reasonable person would have done in his place. A reason-
able person could have relied on Miller's inaccurate opinion, 
which almost matched Lowe's. 
Knox will only be able to prevail at trial if a jury finds, 
after examining admissible opinions of experts that are tested by 
thorough cross-examination, that something in the neighborhood of 
the .$52,500 value claimed by Knox is a fact. In a rare case 
where a buyer is legally permitted to rely on a seller's misrep-
sentation of value, (which must be confirmed as a fact by the 
jury) there is no precedent for altering the standard as to when 
the seller is deemed to have discovered it. Indeed, the Court 
need not worry about creating an exception concerning the running 
of the statute. Knox has an action under existing statutory and 
case law. 
On the other hand, to impute the facts Miller's appraisal 
failed to reveal to Knox would create new law. Existing law iin-
puts to Knox facts either in his possession or facts he would 
have discovered when put on reasonable inquiry. Imputing to him 
the mistake of his qualified agent would indeed stretch the ex-
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i sting limits of U.C.A. Section 7S-12-26<3) as to when an ag-
grieved party discovers the facts constituting fraud or mis take. 
For such an expansion of the law Lowe cites no authority. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court will discover that a jury would have a legal basis 
for finding that Lowe made assertions and representations regard-
ing the value of this property, that such value was a material 
fact, and that Knox was entitled to rely on Lowe's assertions 
because the actual value was concealed from Knox through no neg-
ligence or fault of his own. 
Further, in Knox's deposition, the opinions of Lowe, Miller 
and the Thrift's appraisers are all put forward. Thus, on the 
face oi his deposition Knox placed genuine issues of fact regard-
ing the value of the property and the time of its discovery be-
fore the Court. 
Finally, when viewed in the light most favorable to Knox, 
facts in the Record regarding the time of the discovery of the 
misrepresentation do not as a matter of law deem a 1986 dis-
covery which would place his defense beyond the running of the 
statute of limitations. 
The Third-Party Defendant continues to seek reversal of the 
Order granting Summary Judgment, and a remand for a trial on the 
matter. 
Dated this 6th day of Apr:L 
78-12-26 JUDICIAL CODE 
the date of construction, as well as actions 
based on injuries occurring within the seven-
year period if no action is filed within that pe-
riod. Horton v. Goldminer's Daughter, 785 
P.2d 1087 (Utah 1989). 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 13 Am. Jur. 2d Building and 
Construction Contracts § 114. 
A.L.R. — What statute of limitations gov-
erns action by contractee for defective or im-
proper performance of work by private build-
ing contractor, 1 ALR3d 914. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; c. 1943, 
Supp., 104-12-26; L. 1986, ch. 143, § 1. 
Cross-References. — "Action" includes 
special proceeding, § 78-12-46. 
Livestock branding, Chapter 24 of Title 4. 
Cited in Katsos v. Salt Lake City Corp., 634 
F. Supp. 100 (D. Utah 1986); Lichtefeld v. Cut-
shaw, 784 P.2d 143 (Utah 1989); Stilling v. 
Skankey, 784 P.2d 144 (Utah 1989). 
Time of discovery as affecting running of 
statute of limitations in wrongful death action, 
49 A.L.R.4th 972. 
Key Numbers. — Limitation of Actions «=» 
55(3). 
Product Liability Act, statute of limitations, 
§ 78-15-3. 
Right of action for waste, § 78-38-2. 
Three-year period for actions on insurance 
contracts, § 31A-21-313. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
78-12-26. Within three years. 
Within three years: 
(1) An action for waste, or trespass upon or injury to real property; 
except that when waste or trespass is committed by means of under-
ground works upon any mining claim, the cause of action does not accrue 
until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting such 
waste or trespass. 
(2) An action for taking, detaining, or injuring personal property, in-
cluding actions for specific recovery thereof; except that in all cases where 
the subject of the action is a domestic animal usually included in the term 
"livestock," which at the time of its loss has a recorded mark or brand, if 
the animal strayed or was stolen from the true owner without the owner's 
fault, the cause does not accrue until the owner has actual knowledge of 
such facts as would put a reasonable man upon inquiry as to the posses-
sion of the animal by the defendant. 
(3) An action for relief on the ground of fraud or mistake; except that 
the cause of action in such case does not accrue until the discovery by the 
aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud or mistake. 
(4) An action for a liability created by the statutes of this state, other 
than for a penalty or forfeiture under the laws of this state, except where 
in special cases a different limitation is prescribed by the statutes of this 
state. 
(5) An action to enforce liability imposed by Section 78-17-3, except 
that the cause of action does not accrue until the aggrieved party kpows 
or reasonably should know of the harm suffered. / 
258 
Rule 56 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
was an abuse of discretion. Griffiths v. Ham- J.P.W. Enters., Inc. v. Naef, 604 P.2d 486 
mon, 560 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1977). (Utah 1979); Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92 (Utah 
Cited in Utah Sand & Gravel Prods. Corp. v. 1986). 
Tolbert, 16 Utah 2d 407, 402 P.2d 703 (1965); 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Brigham Young Law Review. — Reason- Opening default or default judgment claimed 
able Assurance of Actual Notice Required for to have been obtained because of attorney's 
In Personam Default Judgment in Utah: Gra- mistake as to time or place of appearance, 
ham v. Sawaya, 1981 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 937. trial, or filing of necessary papers, 21 A.L.R.3d 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 47 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments ^ 5 5 
§ § nH 5 J t 0 IQ n3'r c 1 A • ss ,07 • 01 Q Failure to give notice of application for de-C.J.S. — 49 C J.S. Judgments §§ 187 to 218.
 r u . , . , .. . . , . 
A.L.R. - Necessity of taking proof as to lia- [a u l t J ^ * ^ ^ e ™ *° ** 1S ****** o n ly 
bility against defaulting defendant, 8 A.L.R.3d by custom 28 A.L.R 3d 1383. 
1070. Failure of party or his attorney to appear at 
Appealability of order setting aside, or refus- pretrial conference, 55 A.L.R.3d 303. 
ing to set aside, default judgment, 8 A.L.R.3d Default judgments against the United States 
1272. under Rule 55(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Defaulting defendant's right to notice and Procedure, 55 A.L.R. Fed. 190. 
hearing as to determination of amount of dam- Key Numbers. — Judgment *» 92 to 134. 
ages, 15 A.L.R.3d 586. 
Rule 56. Summary judgment. 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or 
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the 
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of 
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any 
part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or 
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, 
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his 
favor as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least 
10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the 
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be 
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory, in' 
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a 
genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule 
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a 
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the 
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if 
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial contro-
versy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It 
shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without sub-
stantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or 
other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the 
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action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be 
deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
f
 (e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Support-
ing and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set 
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirma-
tively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. 
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affida-
vit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affida-
vits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and 
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the 
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or 
as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that 
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judg-
ment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits 
of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by 
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse th6 
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be 
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such 
other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of 
the court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule 
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall 
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the 
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused 
him to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or 
attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to Cross-References. — Contempt generally, 
Rule 56, F.R.C.P. §§ 78-7-18, 78-32-1 et seq. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS Appeal. 
—Adversely affected party. 
Affidavit. —Standard of review. 
—Contents. Attorney's fees. 
—Corporation. Availability of motion. 
—Experts. Cross-motions. 
—Inconsistency with deposition. Damages. 
—Necessity of opposing affidavits. Discovery. 
Resting on pleadings. Disputed facts. 
—Objection. Evidence. 
—Sufficiency. —Facts considered. 
Hearsay and opinion testimony. —Improper evidence. 
—Superseding pleadings. —Proof. 
—Unpleaded defenses. —Weight of testimony. 
—•Verified pleading. Improper party plaintiff. 
—Waiver of right to contest. Issue of fact. 
—When unavailable. —Corporate existence. 
Exclusive control of facts. —Deeds. 
—Who may make. —Lease as security. 
Affirmative defense. Judicial attitude. 
Answers to interrogatories. Motion for new trial. 
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